When Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s transitional president, appeared on BF1 TV in late September, he did not merely dismiss any prospect of repairing diplomatic ties with France. He chose words of unusual harshness against Paris, confirming a trajectory his government has followed since seizing power in September 2022: gradually severing links with the former colonial partner and steering Burkinabè diplomacy toward new allies, Russia foremost among them.
Since taking office, Traoré has repeatedly voiced hostility toward France, while relations between Ouagadougou and Paris have deteriorated sharply. French forces withdrew, diplomats departed, and several forms of cooperation were called into question. In parallel, the Burkinabè authorities deepened ties with Moscow and consolidated their alignment with Mali and Niger inside the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Presented by the government as a reconquest of national sovereignty, this diplomatic realignment deserves scrutiny beyond political rhetoric. A sovereign state is free to choose its partners, but those choices must allow it to preserve its decision-making autonomy, strengthen national capacities, and durably improve living conditions for its people.
The central question is therefore this: has Burkina Faso truly freed itself from foreign influence, or has it simply replaced one historical partner with another whose interests do not necessarily coincide with its own?
Breaking with Paris does not, by itself, guarantee independence
Rejecting France has become a cornerstone of Traoré’s political messaging. The stance resonates with segments of the population shaped by a long history of unbalanced relations with the former colonial power and by frustrations over the results of past cooperation.
Yet denouncing French influence is not, in itself, a complete sovereignty policy. Breaking with one partner does not automatically mean becoming independent of all external influence. True sovereignty is also measured by a country’s ability to define its own priorities, diversify its partnerships, negotiate balanced agreements, and refuse pressure from any quarter.
By presenting the rupture with Paris as major proof of national emancipation, the Burkinabè leadership risks reducing a complex issue to a contest between two foreign powers. France becomes the symbol of past dependence, while Russia is cast as the solution to that dependence.
That reading needs nuance. No foreign partner Western, Russian, Chinese, or from any other region bases its foreign policy exclusively on defending a third country’s interests. States pursue their own strategic, economic, military, and diplomatic objectives first.
Russia is no exception to that rule.
Russia: a strategic ally, but not a selfless partner
The rapprochement between Ouagadougou and Moscow is one of the most visible shifts in Burkina Faso’s foreign policy since Traoré came to power. Security cooperation occupies a prominent place in this new orientation, as the country confronts persistent insecurity linked to armed terrorist groups.
For the Burkinabè authorities, diversifying military partners can be a way to strengthen national capabilities and move away from cooperation deemed insufficient with France. That choice falls within Burkina Faso’s sovereign right.
However, the question should not be whether Russia is preferable to France in principle, but rather what Burkina Faso concretely obtains from this new relationship.
What are each party’s commitments? What are the financial, military, or economic counterparts? How long do the agreements last? What guarantees frame foreign partners’ interventions? And above all, to what extent does this cooperation contribute to durably strengthening the Burkinabè army’s own capacities?
These questions are essential. Military cooperation can provide operational support, equipment, or technical expertise. But it does not automatically guarantee a lasting improvement in the security situation. Its effectiveness must be judged on verifiable results: protection of populations, securing of road corridors, return of displaced persons, and the ability of public services to function in areas affected by violence.
It would therefore be premature to treat the rapprochement with Moscow alone as proof of strategic success. Conversely, it would be equally excessive to conclude, without examining the agreements and results, that Russia dictates all decisions of the Burkinabè government.
The real issue is whether this partnership increases Burkina Faso’s decision-making capacity or creates new forms of dependence.
Changing partners does not necessarily mean changing the system of dependence
One paradox of Traoré’s policy lies in how sovereignty is framed in public debate. The government claims it wants to free Burkina Faso from Western influence, but that ambition cannot be assessed solely through statements against France or rapprochements with Moscow.
Sovereignty is not limited to choosing military partners. It also concerns control over natural resources, budgetary policy, economic independence, industrial capacity, food security, and the freedom to negotiate with foreign investors.
A country can break with a former partner power while remaining dependent on other actors for military equipment, technology, financing, or certain commercial outlets. Such dependence is not necessarily synonymous with submission, since international relations often rest on interdependence. It becomes problematic, however, when alternative options are limited and the country struggles to defend its own priorities.
That is why Burkina Faso must be judged on its ability to genuinely diversify its relations, develop national skills, and negotiate transparent partnerships.
If Russia becomes an indispensable partner in certain areas without the country having credible alternatives, the risk would be the emergence of a new dependence — even if it is presented under a different political narrative.
This is not to assert that Moscow controls Traoré’s decisions, since no evidence supports such a conclusion. It is rather to recall an obvious fact of international relations: a foreign partner, however politically close, pursues its own interests and cannot be considered selfless by principle.
The AES: a sovereignty ambition that must also prove itself
The alignment between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger within the Alliance of Sahel States reflects this desire to redefine regional power balances. The three countries highlight their sovereignty, their willingness to coordinate policies, and their ambition to strengthen autonomy vis-à-vis external partners.
In principle, regional cooperation can be an important lever. It can facilitate pooled defense resources, intelligence coordination, trade, and the search for common solutions to Sahel challenges.
But a political alliance does not, by itself, guarantee effective collective action. It must demonstrate its ability to deliver concrete results for populations.
On security, persistent attacks, population displacements, and difficulties in certain localities demand rigorous evaluation of adopted strategies. The situation cannot be assessed solely through official statements or talk of territorial reconquest. It requires verifiable data, comparison over time, and particular attention to the situation of civilians.
On the economic front, the ambition of regional integration must also translate into smoother trade, suitable infrastructure, and mechanisms to support producers, traders, and businesses.
Finally, the sovereignty claimed by the AES should also manifest in its members’ ability to maintain diversified relations with multiple partners, without turning opposition to certain powers into the exclusive guiding principle of their diplomacy.
A sovereign alliance is not one that simply changes camps, but one that retains the freedom to choose, to negotiate, and, if necessary, to say no to its own allies.
Political sovereignty cannot overshadow the results populations expect
Beyond diplomatic questions, the debate on sovereignty must be placed back in the daily lives of Burkinabè citizens.
For populations facing insecurity, displacement, economic hardship, or limited access to certain public services, the essential question remains one of results.
The break with France may represent an assumed political choice. The rapprochement with Russia may also serve strategic objectives. But these decisions cannot exempt the authorities from accountability for their effectiveness.
Personal security, continuity of public services, access to healthcare and education, employment opportunities, and protection of economic activities are all indicators for evaluating a government’s performance.
It would therefore be insufficient to measure the success of Traoré’s policy by the number of hostile statements toward Paris, symbols of diplomatic rupture, or meetings with Russian officials.
Results must be examined on the ground, using reliable and independent indicators.
Sovereignty cannot be merely a diplomatic posture. It must translate into an increased capacity of the state to protect its citizens, finance its priorities, and meet the needs of its population.
The real test: Burkina Faso’s freedom of decision
By rejecting any normalization with France, Ibrahim Traoré confirms his choice of a lasting political break with Paris. But this orientation raises a fundamental question about the very conception of sovereignty defended by his regime.
A truly independent country must be able to choose its partners without submitting to their demands, maintain relations with several powers, and defend its interests without being held captive by its alliances.
France has its interests. Russia has its own. Other powers pursue their own objectives as well. No diplomatic rapprochement should therefore be evaluated solely on the basis of ideological proximity between leaders.
Burkina Faso has the right to diversify its partnerships and redefine its strategic priorities. But it falls to its authorities to demonstrate that this realignment produces measurable results and genuinely strengthens the country’s autonomy.
The question is not to systematically defend Paris against Moscow, nor to treat Russia as an adversary by principle. It is to know whether the choices made durably serve Burkina Faso’s interests.
Ultimately, sovereignty is not proclaimed only in speeches against the former colonial power: it is verified in the ability to decide freely, negotiate without constraint, and deliver concrete results for the people.
And it is precisely on that terrain that Ibrahim Traoré’s policy must be assessed beyond slogans, alliances, and diplomatic statements.
By IBRAHIM OUMAROU — Journaliste / Rédacteur