Since the July 2023 coup, Niger has broken decisively with Orano, the French group that mined its uranium for over fifty years. Niamey nationalised Somaïr, stripped Orano of the Imouraren permit, opened talks with Russia, drew interest from China and Iran, and now welcomes new Western investors. The goal is clear: take back control of a strategic resource. Yet the central question remains unanswered — does Niger actually sell its uranium on better terms today than it did under Orano? The available evidence points to a nuanced answer. Niamey’s bargaining power has clearly grown, but no public data yet proves the country consistently secures a higher price. More troubling still, several confidential negotiations have been reported, though no hidden contract has been irrefutably established to date.
Breaking with Orano: sovereignty gained, industry weakened
The split between Niamey and Orano is not merely diplomatic — it is industrial and financial.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien activities in December 2024, before Somaïr, the historic operator of the Arlit mine, was nationalised on 19 June 2025. The French group, which held 63.4% of Somaïr against 36.6% for the Nigerien state, contests the nationalisation and has launched several international arbitration proceedings.
The problem for Niamey is that taking over a mine does not automatically mean having a market.
Nigerien production has fallen sharply over the past decade: from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to data reported in 2026. Niger now has only one operating mine, while several projects remain undeveloped.
In other words, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
The uranium price: beware the false case against Orano
A widespread idea consists of comparing a supposed “French price” with today’s world price. That comparison is misleading.
Uranium does not work like oil: there is no single stock exchange setting a daily price at which all producers sell their output. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries and nuclear utilities, with formulas that may incorporate spot indices and long-term prices.
Historical data nonetheless provide an interesting benchmark.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received around 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that represented roughly 83.75 euros per kilogram of uranium, based on calculations from public data at the time.
Another analysis based on EITI data estimated that uranium bought from Orano had stood at around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram in recent years, or about 33 dollars per pound, while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid around 60,000 CFA francs/kg.
The market has changed considerably since then.
In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was 70.33 dollars per pound, against 53.59 dollars in 2024. The average price of multi-year contracts, however, was much lower, at 54.70 dollars per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood at around 89.63 dollars/lb, while the long-term price reached approximately 96.50 dollars/lb.
The conclusion matters: Niger today enjoys a far more favourable price environment than in the early 2020s. But that does not prove Niamey actually sells its uranium at 90 or 100 dollars per pound.
This is where the file becomes opaque.
The mysterious 170-million-dollar Russian contract
The most striking case concerns the yellowcake stock accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed Niamey had reached an agreement with Russia covering 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for about 170 million dollars. If confirmed, that would amount to roughly 170 dollars per kilogram, or close to 77 dollars per pound.
That price would therefore be below the spot price of late September 2026, but comparable to certain contractual levels observed on the international market.
The problem is that this agreement has never been officially confirmed by either party. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom stated it was not party to the alleged deal.
Yet the affair is not simply a rumour without material elements.
In November 2025, about 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were indeed loaded onto trucks at Arlit. Around thirty vehicles then reached Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately became stuck at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the grey zone begins.
A physical transfer of such magnitude is not, in itself, proof of a sale. But it demonstrates that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialise the stock.
The 170-million-dollar figure must therefore be presented as an allegation documented by several sources, not as an established contract.
What about Iran? Confidential talks that left traces
The Russian file is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, Le Monde revealed the existence of confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at around 56 million dollars. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the talks took place.
The Nigerien government nevertheless denied concluding a sale. An adviser to the authorities did acknowledge that Iran had wanted to buy those 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey had refused for lack of available stock.
Here again, three notions must be distinguished: negotiation, agreement and executed contract.
The available information establishes that negotiations took place. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery occurred.
Russia and China: new allies or new customers?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stocks. In 2025, sources reported discussions potentially covering around 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices.
Above all, they give Niger more negotiating options.
That is a fundamental difference.
So does Niger sell its uranium better today?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet demonstrated.
Niger now holds three advantages it did not possess with the same intensity before.
First, the international uranium price is much higher.
Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners: Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian and American players.
Third, the government now directly controls an essential part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses limit this strategy: falling production, logistical problems and legal uncertainty linked to the dispute with Orano.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal also ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation.
Political sovereignty is therefore not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium “at the best price”. But to achieve that, it must be able to produce regularly, transport its ore safely, attract capital and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalised Somaïr. At the same time, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to 414 million dollars in financing for Global Atomic’s Dasa project, led by a Canadian company.
This may be the real turning point.
Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into a lever of competition between several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence allows the claim that new contracts bring Niger more than those concluded under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating possibilities are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their pricing formulas, premiums, logistical costs and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for “hidden contracts”, there are confidential negotiations and accusations serious enough to justify investigations, particularly around Iran and Russia. But speaking of definitively established secret contracts would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real issue for Niamey is therefore no longer just knowing whom to sell its uranium to. It is knowing at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will effectively remain in Niger.