A year has passed since the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, formalized its charter and established its confederation. Yet, questions frequently arise regarding its ability to fulfill its central pledge: mutual defense. In the face of recent security escalations and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention has prompted concerns among local populations and regional observers alike.
Several structural and strategic elements contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.
National armies already stretched thin
The primary constraint remains the overextension of national armed forces. Each member state of the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:
- In Mali: The military, alongside its allies, remains primarily focused on securing the North and Centre regions against the JIM (Cadre stratégique permanent and Al-Qaïda-affiliated groups).
- In Burkina Faso: Over half of the national territory endures constant pressure from persistent terrorist assaults.
- In Niger: The armed forces are simultaneously tasked with safeguarding the Liptako-Gourma region (the three-borders area) from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the Lake Chad basin.
Within this challenging environment, none of the three nations possesses sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a substantial contingent to a neighboring state without compromising its own national security framework.
Logistical hurdles for a joint force
Although the political decision to unify forces received approval during the AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters significant material challenges:
- Interopérability and command: Coordinating diverse military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command demands considerable time and secure communication networks.
- Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops across vast distances in the Sahel necessitates substantial armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence assets (such as drones and combat aircraft). These capacities remain limited and are heavily utilized locally.
The role of external partners
The withdrawal of traditional military forces, particularly France and the UN mission MINUSMA, led the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, notably through the deployment of the Africa Corps paramilitary group. However, these supporting forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct cross-border operations under the AES banner.
A strategic shift towards intelligence
Beyond large-scale troop deployments, AES authorities emphasize an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted operations along shared borders. For Sahelian military headquarters, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a visible grand deployment, but rather as coordinated actions within the three-borders zone, where each army primarily operates from its own sovereign territory.
