Facing a multifaceted terrorist threat and growing discontent within his own ranks, General Abdourahamane Tiani is attempting a high-stakes maneuver. Navigating treacherous waters with clandestine talks in Say with the GSIM and a firm hand on the military hierarchy, the leader of Niger’s transition is struggling to prevent the capital from collapsing.
the say channel: costly tactical realism
The confidential meeting on March 24 near Say marks a significant turning point. By dispatching a delegation of four emissaries to the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), General Tiani is abandoning the stance of “absolute firmness” to embrace a survival-based realism.
Analysis of the situation reveals two strategic pillars:
- Prioritizing the enemy: Faced with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), whose radicalism was demonstrated by the attack on Diori-Hamani airport in January, the junta seeks to “neutralize” the GSIM through dialogue. The aim is to transform an exhausting triangular conflict into a more manageable bilateral front.
- The specter of the Bamako blockade: Niger is watching the situation in Mali with concern, where the GSIM is attempting to suffocate the capital. By discussing the demands of the Katiba Hanifa (release of prisoners, payment of an annual tribute), Niamey hopes to secure a vital logistical respite.
unrest within the ranks: the ticking time bomb of wages
However, no high-level strategy can succeed without a united troop. The recent dismissal of the head of the Security and Intelligence Battalion (BSR) in Tahoua, following complaints about wages (800 CFA francs received instead of 1,200), reveals a deep structural flaw.
This elite unit, once a pillar of cooperation with US special forces before their forced departure in 2024, now symbolizes the disarray of an army facing budget cuts and internal logistical problems. Colonel Mamane Sani Kiaou, chief of staff of the army, had to intervene personally to quell the unrest, proving that the internal threat is at least as formidable as the jihadist threat.
security vacuum and geopolitical pivot
The intensification of these secret negotiations occurs within a context of profound shifts in alliances. Since the departure of French and American troops, Niger has turned to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and new partners such as Russia and Turkey.
Yet, despite the arrival of military advisors and new equipment (including surveillance drones), the situation on the ground remains challenging. The lack of high-precision aerial intelligence sharing, once provided by Base 101 in Niamey and Agadez, now forces the junta to reinvent ground-level diplomacy with those they fought against yesterday.
the paradox of continuity: the shadow of mohamed bazoum
The ultimate irony lies in the involuntary imitation of the former regime’s strategy. While the coup of July 26, 2023, was officially justified by the “security failure” of Mohamed Bazoum, General Tiani finds himself forced to use the same levers: negotiation as a component of counter-insurgency.
But where Bazoum assumed this dialogue to free hostages (such as the nun Suellen Tennyson), the current junta must operate in secrecy, fearing that this dialogue will be perceived by its most radical supporters—and its AES allies—as an admission of weakness in the face of Al-Qaeda.
The Niamey regime is at a crossroads. Negotiating with the GSIM to isolate the EIGS is a rational calculation, but extremely politically risky. By agreeing to discuss on the basis of “tributes” or “withdrawal from areas,” the junta risks permanently legitimizing armed groups. For General Tiani, the hardest part is no longer taking power, but maintaining the cohesion of an army that is starting to count its pennies while the enemy counts its conquests.
