The French stance on the critical situation gripping Mali is becoming increasingly defined. Bruno Fuchs, a centrist Member of Parliament with the Modem party and the esteemed president of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, openly shared his perspectives during a recent interview, offering a candid assessment of the challenging landscape.

Beyond optimistic assertions regarding France’s future influence across the continent — suggesting that eliminating perceived “irritants” such as the CFA franc and visa issues could restore France as a desired partner — the most striking aspect of his interview was an inherent contradiction. This tension lies between promises to move beyond the colonial ‘Françafrique’ relationship and a persistent preoccupation with reclaiming lost influence in the face of Russian engagement, a key element in current Sahel politics.

His commentary on Mali proved particularly striking and, for some, even cynical. Bruno Fuchs, echoing what some French military and political strategists might believe following the complex attack on April 25, presented a clear narrative: “The Russians are currently negotiating their withdrawal from Mali, and the ruling junta in Bamako is set to collapse within a matter of weeks or months.” This statement offers a stark Sahel analysis of the current geopolitical shifts in West Africa.

Referring to President Emmanuel Macron’s earlier remarks in Nairobi – “the departure of French military personnel was undoubtedly not the best decision the putschists made for their country” – the interviewer probed whether France welcomed the perceived military setbacks faced by Russian forces in northern Mali.

“The removal of the French partner was counterproductive”

Bruno Fuchs sidestepped the direct question, instead paraphrasing President Macron: “The removal of the French partner was counterproductive.” The underlying message was clear. The parliamentarian then continued with his predicted scenario: “I believe the Malian junta has only days or weeks left. Today, it finds itself in a weak position relative to the FLA and the JNIM. Therefore, a change in regime in Mali is inevitable within weeks or months.”

The French parliamentarian then ventured into particularly sensitive territory. He suggested that Malians face a choice between “integralist jihadists” – a concept he acknowledged as curious, and “not for everyone” – alongside FLA rebels on one side, and on the other, a return to democratic life, public liberties, and the previous way of life in Mali. “Life in Mali is likely to change,” he reiterated, seemingly overlooking the fourteen years of conflict already endured by the beleaguered population, highlighting the complexity of any Mali JNIM negotiations.

“How to integrate JNIM?“

With unwavering confidence, Bruno Fuchs then outlined Mali’s political future, proposing two possible scenarios. In the first, Bamako agrees to negotiate. “If the junta and President Assimi Goïta are reasonable, they will open negotiations. There would be a transition period of three to six months led by one of the military figures from the Transition – I won’t name names, but it wouldn’t be Assimi Goïta – leading to elections within three or six months.” We can set aside the unrealistic timeline. Such a transition, initiated under pressure from JNIM, would, in his view, raise a central question: “The question arises: in governance, in collaborative work, how do we integrate JNIM?” This formulation warrants careful consideration: JNIM is affiliated with al-Qaeda, and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was France’s public enemy number one, with France having lost 57 soldiers in the fight against this group in the Sahel.

On JNIM, Bruno Fuchs appeared to possess first-hand intelligence, perhaps even more than any Malian. A significant revelation, indeed!

“I believe JNIM is prepared to lay down its arms and cease armed struggle, provided it can participate in the political life of the country, not to take control of Mali, but to participate.” The President of the Foreign Affairs Committee did not explain why the most powerful actor on the ground would settle for mere participation without asserting its dominance. Perhaps because, as everyone knows, the important thing is not to win but to participate. This presents a cruel dilemma: “The question that will arise for us, Europeans or French, is what do we do? Do we support this transition in which JNIM has a political role, or do we not? I don’t have the answer, but it’s a real problem of conscience and a real political problem.” Indeed, it is a serious question, not only “for us, Europeans or French” but primarily for the Malian people, who are at the heart of any Mali JNIM negotiations.

“The worst: Afghanistan”

• Bruno Fuchs pulled a second scenario from his pocket. “The junta insists on resisting, refuses to negotiate, and at some point, finds itself in a position of weakness. The Russians are negotiating their departure, contrary to what they claim (…). At that point, the junta will fall. If it’s not negotiated, it will certainly be worse than if there had been a negotiation.” Worse for whom? For Mali, for the region, for France? Fuchs did not specify. Returning to his first scenario, the parliamentarian elaborated on the potential outcomes of the hoped-for negotiations.

“We could see a Mauritanian-style model, meaning a religious regime; or a Nigerian-style model, a federal state in Mali where some states apply Sharia law (…) and others do not. So, ultimately, a federal state with different regimes, guaranteeing the representativeness and role of each community in the country’s political life, as in Nigeria for example.” This scenario appears to be Bruno Fuchs’s preference: a not-too-extremist Islamic Republic where each community’s representation and role are guaranteed. How? He didn’t specify. It’s a pity, as it would have advanced the debate. The challenge for Mali, in fact, is that its communities share the same space; they do not yet live in separate enclaves. All this remains rather vague, even hazy, in the context of complex Sahel politics.

The second scenario, the “ultimate model,” is Afghanistan. While Bruno Fuchs seemed comfortable with the first, he stated he “does not wish for an Afghanistan in the heart of the Sahel, because that would have consequences for the entire zone,” including, of course, the Sahelian nations and their “innocent” neighbors: Guinea, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo. “Complicated,” he concluded, an understatement given the regional implications and the need for comprehensive West Africa insider news.

“The Russians would be ready to withdraw”

Somewhat stunned by these definitive pronouncements, the interviewer pressed on. “Do you have information indicating that the Russians are preparing to leave Bamako?”

“Yes,” Bruno Fuchs replied without hesitation. “They are negotiating. They have repositioned their forces. Negotiations are currently underway.” Regarding the uncertain outcome of these discussions, “everything depends on JNIM, everything depends on the junta.” However, he was certain that the Russians “would be ready to withdraw, provided they receive certain guarantees regarding the assets they currently exploit in Mali, such as the gold mines, for which they are unwilling to feel dispossessed, even if their legitimacy to exploit them is, in my opinion, quite debatable.” This adds another layer to the Mali Burkina Niger analysis of foreign involvement.

Bruno Fuchs, despite expressing a desire to close the unfortunate chapter of Françafrique – a behavior “dating back to colonization,” a history “we haven’t settled with Francophone Africa,” a way of imposing “our truths and our views” and not tolerating “resistance” – still holds a firm opinion on who is legitimate to exploit Mali’s resources. This reflects ongoing debates about Sahel analysis English perspectives on resource management.

The implicit message is that France, and arguably Europe “to avoid immodesty,” possesses greater legitimacy than Russia. And why? Because France “is reliable in its commitments,” unlike the Americans and Russians “who are in the process of leaving Mali because things are not going well for them.” Without missing a beat, he then cited the example of the Central African Republic, with which “we have normalized our relations, we have re-established normal relations with President Faustin Archange Touadéra,” even though “the Russians are present there.” “We must learn to work with everyone,” he stressed.

With everyone, it seems, except the disfavored leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States.