The interpretation of a coup d’état often shifts, influenced by the international community’s agenda and the endorsement of neighboring states. In this context, the “appointment” of Transitional President Michel Kafando faced scrutiny for being unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, Burkina Faso was set to operate under provisional institutions.
These transitional structures progressively took shape, much like a construction set. Following the military’s emergence into the public sphere, in the wake of Blaise Compaoré’s swift departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou appeared to regain a semblance of stability. Out of relative obscurity, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida stepped forward, assuming the full authority of a Head of State. His true intentions were initially unclear. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a calculated move orchestrated by President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain control over power? Regardless, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace immediately raised suspicions and distrust. The military’s initial actions, including suspending the Constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, sparked fears of a lasting junta. It seemed the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, might be deprived of their hard-won victory. True to form, the African Union promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – converged to engage with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to exercise caution: a forceful power grab would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked national isolation and mounting unpopularity. Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the transitional executive, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had championed the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, bore the critical responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This temporary arrangement was set to conclude in November 2015, marking the original end of President Blaise Compaoré’s mandate. For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component – the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was tasked with submitting a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen: The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, director of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the former regime. The army adopted a broader approach, diversifying its candidate profiles: an ecclesiastic, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop, initially considered a frontrunner, declared his disinterest in the position, preferring to continue his current ministry. The remaining two candidates held an advantage due to their extensive experience in prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, from 1981 to 1982 and again from 1998 to 2011. In the Land of the Upright Men, an invisible divide separated society into those for and against Sankara. This implicit cleavage would influence every political figure throughout their careers. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held fundamentally opposing ideologies. Experience in an international institution offered a dual benefit: a boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an expanded network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists presented by the opposition. For a few months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, would set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in peril! He would simultaneously hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single point of contact and bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida. The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, currently chairing ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical reasons. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (AU), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a rehabilitation of Burkina Faso. Did this robust representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a Constitution suspended just weeks prior? The United States generally adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who lack universal suffrage, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. Thus, the international community orchestrated a way to legitimize the coup and restore a semblance of constitutional order. American reconnaissance planes, therefore, remained in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region. Out of 26 ministerial positions, the army secured four key portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, former Security Minister in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida’s spokesperson, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo received the position of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, had to resign just days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having “shelved” the Norbert Zongo case. The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected one of the unsuccessful presidential candidates, Chériff Sy Moumina, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The remaining task was to finalize the institutions and mechanisms that would steer Burkina Faso toward transparent and equitable elections: the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral code, and organic laws.
What were the core objectives for this brief transitional period? In early December, Michel Kafando signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate were crucial questions. Over 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the Land of the Upright Men aimed to embark on a process of catharsis. Shortly after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a significant role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco’s “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré. Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand considerable time, likely extending beyond the transition period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s chief of staff and Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace. Would Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso managed to defuse the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, without major complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the unrest could have triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to focus on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by re-examining the Sankara dossier? How could a witch hunt be avoided? Two general managers of major national enterprises, perceived as close to the ousted president’s family, had already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). An act of contrition doesn’t fully erase past misdeeds but contributes to appeasement; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to bullets during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery. Would the CRNR endure beyond the transitional period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties were poised to take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively barred them from running in the general elections. Presidential candidates were already at the starting blocks. The formation of the CNT also prompted the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to self-dissolve. The political contest was undoubtedly set to intensify at the beginning of 2015.
These transitional structures progressively took shape, much like a construction set. Following the military’s emergence into the public sphere, in the wake of Blaise Compaoré’s swift departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou appeared to regain a semblance of stability. Out of relative obscurity, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida stepped forward, assuming the full authority of a Head of State. His true intentions were initially unclear. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a calculated move orchestrated by President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain control over power? Regardless, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace immediately raised suspicions and distrust. The military’s initial actions, including suspending the Constitution and dissolving the National Assembly, sparked fears of a lasting junta. It seemed the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, might be deprived of their hard-won victory. True to form, the African Union promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – converged to engage with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to exercise caution: a forceful power grab would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked national isolation and mounting unpopularity. Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the transitional executive, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had championed the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, bore the critical responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This temporary arrangement was set to conclude in November 2015, marking the original end of President Blaise Compaoré’s mandate. For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component – the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was tasked with submitting a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen: The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, director of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the former regime. The army adopted a broader approach, diversifying its candidate profiles: an ecclesiastic, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop, initially considered a frontrunner, declared his disinterest in the position, preferring to continue his current ministry. The remaining two candidates held an advantage due to their extensive experience in prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, from 1981 to 1982 and again from 1998 to 2011. In the Land of the Upright Men, an invisible divide separated society into those for and against Sankara. This implicit cleavage would influence every political figure throughout their careers. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held fundamentally opposing ideologies. Experience in an international institution offered a dual benefit: a boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an expanded network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists presented by the opposition. For a few months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, would set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in peril! He would simultaneously hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single point of contact and bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida. The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, currently chairing ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical reasons. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (AU), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a rehabilitation of Burkina Faso. Did this robust representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a Constitution suspended just weeks prior? The United States generally adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who lack universal suffrage, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. Thus, the international community orchestrated a way to legitimize the coup and restore a semblance of constitutional order. American reconnaissance planes, therefore, remained in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region. Out of 26 ministerial positions, the army secured four key portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, former Security Minister in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida’s spokesperson, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo received the position of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, had to resign just days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having “shelved” the Norbert Zongo case. The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected one of the unsuccessful presidential candidates, Chériff Sy Moumina, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The remaining task was to finalize the institutions and mechanisms that would steer Burkina Faso toward transparent and equitable elections: the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral code, and organic laws.
What were the core objectives for this brief transitional period? In early December, Michel Kafando signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate were crucial questions. Over 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the Land of the Upright Men aimed to embark on a process of catharsis. Shortly after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a significant role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco’s “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré. Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand considerable time, likely extending beyond the transition period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s chief of staff and Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace. Would Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso managed to defuse the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, without major complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the unrest could have triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to focus on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by re-examining the Sankara dossier? How could a witch hunt be avoided? Two general managers of major national enterprises, perceived as close to the ousted president’s family, had already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). An act of contrition doesn’t fully erase past misdeeds but contributes to appeasement; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to bullets during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery. Would the CRNR endure beyond the transitional period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties were poised to take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively barred them from running in the general elections. Presidential candidates were already at the starting blocks. The formation of the CNT also prompted the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to self-dissolve. The political contest was undoubtedly set to intensify at the beginning of 2015.
