Mali’s trade corridors under siege as JNIM tightens grip on key supply lines
The recent surge in coordinated assaults by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) has plunged Mali into a new cycle of violence. On April 25, simultaneous strikes rocked strategic cities including Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and Bamako—the capital—leaving a trail of destruction and claiming the life of Defense Minister Sadio Camara.
In response, Malian forces launched a sweeping counteroffensive targeting militant strongholds. Military prosecutors in Bamako confirmed the detention of multiple suspects, including active-duty soldiers, discharged personnel, and civilians linked to the attacks.
Within days, the JNIM escalated its campaign by imposing a blockade on Bamako, cutting off critical supply routes. The closure of the Kita-Bamako highway trapped hundreds of travelers and severed access to essential goods such as food and water. The disruption has since expanded, with transport convoys on the Conakry-Bamako axis—previously considered safer—now coming under repeated assault.
The blockade is not an isolated incident but part of a broader strategy. Since September 2025, the JNIM has systematically targeted fuel convoys along western and southern Mali’s supply arteries, threatening to cripple regional commerce if the pattern persists.
Regional trade arteries choked by insecurity
West Africa’s coastal and Sahelian nations are deeply interconnected through trade. Coastal ports serve as lifelines for landlocked Sahelian countries, with overland corridors acting as umbilical cords sustaining economies across borders. Most of these routes pass through areas under JNIM influence, making them vulnerable to disruption.
The Dakar-Bamako corridor, a vital link between Senegal and Mali, has borne the brunt of the recent escalation. In 2024, Mali accounted for 26.5% of Senegal’s exports—nearly 802.8 billion FCFA (1.42 billion USD). By the third quarter of 2025, exports to Mali had reached 662 billion FCFA (1.17 billion USD). However, JNIM attacks in western Mali have taken a heavy toll. Between September and November 2025, the Port of Dakar reported daily delays of approximately 120 containers bound for Mali, costing Senegal an estimated 15 billion FCFA (26.54 million USD) per month. By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were stranded in Dakar. By February 2026, around 4,000 empty containers remained stranded in Bamako, as drivers refused to risk the return journey on the perilous route.
The blockade has severely restricted Mali’s access to petroleum products, refined fuels, hydraulic cement, and food supplies. Thousands of truckers, traders, and logistics operators face mounting financial strain. Other corridors linking ports in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Bénin to the Sahel are also at risk of similar disruptions.
The Abidjan-Bamako corridor, a critical artery for Mali within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), has come under increasing threat. By the end of 2025, approximately 1.47 million tons of goods had traversed this route—now increasingly targeted by JNIM attacks near Sikasso.
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali’s top African supplier, also plays a crucial role in Burkina Faso’s imports, particularly in petroleum, electricity, and fertilizers. Most of Burkina Faso’s imports originate or transit through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. The recent attack on Ghanaian tomato traders in Titao, northern Burkina Faso, underscores the growing security risks along this network. While the threat is most pronounced in Mali, authorities have implemented measures to mitigate risks, including military escorts for fuel convoys since November 2025. These convoys now transport 200 to 300 tanker trucks weekly—down from nearly 1,200 before the attacks.
To streamline operations, the government has signed agreements with Malian petroleum associations to expedite customs procedures. Fuel rationing has been introduced to curb black-market activity, and efforts are underway to redirect some trade flows to alternative ports to ease pressure on Dakar and Abidjan.
Collaboration or collapse: the path forward for west africa
The April 25 attacks highlight the limitations of Mali’s military-focused counterterrorism approach. Despite internal divisions, the JNIM and FLA demonstrated a rare unity in orchestrating these large-scale offensives. Meanwhile, regional states struggle to forge cohesive alliances.
The blockade’s regional fallout underscores the urgent need for joint protection of transnational trade corridors. Regional bodies including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the Entente Council, the Mano River Union, and UEMOA must act decisively to prevent the spread of this disruption to other critical routes.
The fight against terrorism could serve as a catalyst for reviving essential regional cooperation between Sahelian and coastal West African states.
