The Sahel region is experiencing a dangerous escalation in militant activity, with armed groups extending their reach beyond traditional conflict zones and deploying economic warfare tactics to destabilize governments. This strategic shift is creating a new era of interconnected violence that threatens both regional security and economic prosperity.
militant groups intensify campaigns across the Sahel
In 2025, militant organizations such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) significantly expanded their operations across West Africa. Their campaigns now span Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and are reaching into Benin and Nigeria, transforming previously distinct conflicts into a single, volatile theater of operations.
These groups are employing sophisticated strategies to undermine state authority and disrupt economic flows. In Mali, JNIM implemented a comprehensive fuel and transport embargo targeting cities like Kayes and Nioro du Sahel. This blockade severely restricted trade and transportation networks connecting Bamako to critical regions, triggering nationwide fuel shortages and dramatic price increases. The embargo was specifically designed to paralyze the economy, weaken government legitimacy, and challenge the military regime’s control.
economic warfare becomes a primary strategy
Economic disruption has emerged as a cornerstone of militant operations in 2025. Militant groups are systematically targeting:
- Key infrastructure: Blockades on fuel supplies and transportation routes
- Economic hubs: Mining facilities, industrial production centers, and trade corridors
- Foreign interests: Kidnapping campaigns targeting international workers and nationals
In Burkina Faso, JNIM demonstrated its growing military capabilities by capturing provincial capitals such as Djibo and Diapaga in May, followed by a devastating ambush on a military convoy in Soum province that resulted in nearly 90 soldier fatalities. These operations highlight the group’s intent to undermine state authority through sustained military pressure and territorial control.
In Niger, while overall violence remains lower than in neighboring countries, militant activity is spreading into previously secure regions. The Islamic State Sahel Province has intensified attacks on the Benin-Niger oil pipeline in the Dosso and Tahoua regions, while kidnapping incidents in urban centers like Niamey demonstrate the expanding reach of militant operations.
kidnapping campaigns target foreign nationals
Both JNIM and ISSP have launched coordinated kidnapping campaigns targeting foreign workers and nationals, resulting in record-high abduction numbers in Mali and Niger. These operations serve multiple strategic purposes:
- Generating revenue through ransom demands
- Disrupting foreign investment and economic activity
- Undermining international confidence in regional stability
JNIM primarily focuses on industrial and mining sites, while ISSP targets both Western nationals and foreign laborers, often outsourcing abductions to criminal networks.
coastal west africa emerges as new frontline
A critical development in 2025 is the consolidation of a new conflict frontline in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands. This strategic region has become a focal point for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant groups, creating a dangerous intersection of previously separate conflict theaters.
Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record as JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso, culminating in the loss of over 50 soldiers in Park W. By mid-year, the group had advanced further south into the Borgou department along the Nigeria border, marking a significant southward expansion beyond traditional northern strongholds.
Meanwhile, ISSP has reinforced its presence in southwestern Niger, moving closer to the border city of Gaya and continuing operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. The group has established itself in northwestern and western Nigeria, creating a contiguous militant presence stretching from Mali to western Nigeria.
This regional convergence represents a turning point in West African security, with previously distinct Sahelian and Nigerian conflict theaters merging into a single, interconnected conflict environment. The borderlands are now becoming a key arena of competition among multiple militant factions, including:
- JNIM and ISSP (Sahel-based groups)
- Ansaru and Mahmuda (Nigerian factions)
- Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
- Various bandit groups
As these groups expand into shared territories, increased interaction and evolving patterns of violence are likely to emerge across these critical border regions.
regional governments face mounting challenges
The military-led regimes in the central Sahel are confronting unprecedented challenges as militant pressure intensifies:
Mali’s fuel crisis and economic strain
In Mali, the ongoing fuel and transport embargo continues to devastate the economy and restrict civilian movement. This prolonged disruption is exacerbating hardship for local populations while undermining the junta’s legitimacy. The economic crisis risks deepening divisions within the armed forces and potentially triggering unrest that the military government may struggle to contain.
Burkina Faso’s territorial losses
Burkina Faso faces similar challenges, with years of sustained conflict leaving its military and auxiliary forces severely overstretched. JNIM’s temporary capture of major towns demonstrates both the group’s strategic evolution and the state’s inability to defend critical administrative centers. Continued military casualties and territorial losses could generate the same internal dissent and coup pressures that have characterized previous regime changes in the country.
Across the central Sahel, state authority is steadily eroding despite junta promises to restore security. Militant groups now contest sovereignty over vast rural territories, where they enforce their own social and economic systems. Their influence is increasingly encroaching on major population centers that were once considered relatively insulated from militant activity.
local defense groups under unprecedented strain
Local self-defense organizations, which have been central to state counter-insurgency efforts, are facing unprecedented pressure:
- In Mali, many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-imposed security arrangements for basic economic access
- In Burkina Faso, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) has suffered heavy losses and remains largely on the defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory
As these local defense structures weaken, militant groups are likely to expand their territorial control and social influence.
international partnerships show limited effectiveness
The Russian Africa Corps has replaced the Wagner Group in supporting Sahelian military regimes, but with limited success. While Africa Corps has provided some protection for fuel convoys and supply routes in southern Mali, its capabilities remain constrained compared to Wagner’s previous operations. The shift in focus to securing critical infrastructure suggests an acknowledgment of JNIM’s economic warfare strategy rather than an effective counter-militant solution.
Looking ahead to 2026, the combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened local defense structures, and declining state capacity creates a dangerous environment for political stability in the central Sahel. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes face internal divisions or popular unrest, a regional domino effect could trigger deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation across the Sahel and its southern borders.
