The Central African Republic (CAR) has grappled with profound instability for decades, beginning with a three-year civil war that engulfed the nation in 2004, followed by protracted conflicts against various insurgent groups. In an attempt to re-establish order, the government extended an invitation to Russian Wagner Group mercenaries in early 2018, initially deploying them as trainers.
By 2019, the Wagner Group had solidified its presence, with over 1,000 operatives deeply integrated into the CAR’s political, economic, and social institutions. Their strategic focus quickly shifted to exploiting valuable natural resources, including gold extraction, diamonds, and timber logging. This extensive involvement has cultivated a pervasive conflict economy, where these mercenaries and other factions actively profit from the nation’s ongoing chaos.
Our investigations reveal that Wagner operatives not only aggressively penetrated local markets through coercion and intimidation but also secured a significant foothold within President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s administration. This influence is exemplified by the positioning of a Russian national as a senior security advisor.
In 2021, a joint military campaign by Wagner and government forces was launched nationwide. While ostensibly aimed at stabilization and counter-insurgency, this operation rapidly evolved into a broader strategy for territorial, political, and economic consolidation across the Central African Republic.
Today, the combined efforts of government and Wagner forces have fundamentally reshaped the CAR’s economy. What once sustained rebel groups has been repurposed to bolster President Touadéra’s government and channel wealth directly to Russia.
Local elites, collaborating with their foreign security partners, allied armed groups, and various economic players, have leveraged coercion and organized crime to solidify their authority, seize control of vital resources, and advance their financial agendas. This has effectively transformed the Central African Republic into a crucial hub for powerful transnational criminal networks. Other nations, including the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda, and Turkey, also exert influence within the CAR.
The involvement of Russian mercenaries in the Central African Republic is unequivocally transactional. Their expanding presence aims to merge security, economic, and political control over natural resources, securing Russia’s long-term influence in the region.
With Russian backing, President Touadéra has notably consolidated his political authority. Concurrently, Wagner-linked actors and their allies have become deeply embedded within key ministries, security agencies, customs administration, and strategic resource sectors. Far from delivering stability, this partnership between Bangui and Moscow has intensified and systematized patterns of coercion, resource extraction, and predation.
While government forces have made gains against armed groups, this has not eradicated the inherent “rapacity of conflict” within the mining sector, trade routes, and taxation. Instead, this exploitation has been redirected, now benefiting government-linked actors, networks, and individuals who profit from these various sectors.
Russia, in particular, has reaped substantial benefits from the Central African Republic’s gold and fuel trade. The Wagner Group has established an extensive illicit fuel supply chain, directly funding its joint military operations with the government and its own mining activities.
The sheer scale of Wagner’s involvement in the Central African Republic’s gold trade is striking. The “mass and blatant volume” of gold being extracted within the country, particularly by Wagner-controlled interests, is estimated to be approximately 5 tons annually.
This significant gold output holds an estimated export value of around $250 million, yet its worth on the international market could easily double, reaching $500 million.
Since 2021, Russian and Rwandan forces have systematically reclaimed crucial mining regions across the Central African Republic, effectively dislodging armed groups from controlling these territories. Consequently, a greater volume of artisanal gold has been channeled through official export routes. Gold exports reached 1.7 tons in 2023. While projections for 2025 anticipated total exports around 2.5 tons, actual figures by the end of that year dramatically surged to 7 tons.
This remarkable figure “far exceeds the capacity of artisanal production,” strongly suggesting the inclusion of industrially mined gold, most likely originating from Wagner’s own concessions.
While the security arrangement between Russia and the Central African Republic may appear somewhat unique on the continent, Russia’s broader ambition to secure African resources, particularly gold, is not. Since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 until the close of 2023, Russian forces have reportedly seized over $2.5 billion worth of African gold.
Russia’s aggressive pursuit of gold is primarily concentrated in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. In the CAR, the Wagner Group has secured exclusive rights to the Ndassima mine, the country’s largest. Meanwhile, Russia controls a significant refinery and stands as the “primary buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold” in Sudan. In Mali, Russian mercenaries receive millions of dollars monthly in cash payments from the ruling junta, which heavily depends on gold mining companies for the majority of its tax revenues. This intricate network effectively circumvents international sanctions through “complex smuggling routes and commercial concealment tactics” employed across the Central African Republic and Sudan.
