The Senegalese Constitutional Council, once hailed for its bold stance in February 2024, has taken a puzzling step backward. In a decision handed down on June 17, 2026, the Council declined to rule on the merits of a dispute over the reinstatement of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko as a member of parliament, instead citing a lack of jurisdiction. While the move may appear technical at first glance, it raises deeper questions about the Council’s evolving role and its own jurisprudential legacy.
The case revolved around the National Assembly’s decision to reinstate Sonko, whose parliamentary status had been a focal point of political and legal contention. The plaintiffs argued that the Council’s jurisdiction extended beyond electoral disputes, asserting that the matter touched on core constitutional principles—including the separation of powers, parliamentary incompatibilities, and adherence to the Assembly’s internal regulations. They pointed to the Council’s own landmark rulings, including decisions n°08/2017 (July 26, 2017) and n°1/C/2024 (February 15, 2024), which had expanded its regulatory authority.
From bold assertion to procedural evasion
The Council’s June 17 ruling focused narrowly on its electoral mandate, concluding that its authority over election-related matters ended once results were finalized. While legally defensible, this reasoning sidestepped the constitutional dimension of the dispute. The plaintiffs had contended that the Assembly’s reinstatement of Sonko implicated broader institutional integrity, a domain where the Council’s role as guardian of constitutional supremacy is most critical.
In 2024, the Council had emphatically declared its duty to intervene in crises threatening institutional stability, asserting that its mandate included preserving public order, peace, and the continuity of governance. Yet in 2026, it chose a different path—one that echoed a familiar tactic: resolving sensitive disputes through procedural dismissal rather than substantive judgment. The result? A constitutional question remains unanswered, and the Council’s jurisprudence appears to have regressed.
Sonko’s legal team, in their defense, went further, arguing that the Council’s authority is strictly limited to cases explicitly enumerated in the Constitution and organic laws. This restrictive interpretation—ironically at odds with the Council’s own past pronouncements—has left observers questioning whether the body is retreating from its progressive stance of 2024.
A paradox for Senegal’s constitutional order
The irony is striking. Those now in power, who once criticized the Council’s past reluctance to assert its authority, now seem to embrace the very culture of jurisdictional avoidance they once condemned. The June 17 decision is less about Sonko’s parliamentary seat and more about the Council’s own credibility. By declining to rule, it has forfeited an opportunity to affirm its role as a bulwark against institutional crises.
The question now looms: if the Constitutional Council abdicates its responsibility in a matter of such constitutional gravity, who will step in to safeguard the rule of law? The Council’s retreat leaves a void—and a troubling precedent. On February 15, 2024, it took a giant leap forward. On June 17, 2026, it retreated two steps, narrowing its mission at a critical juncture for Senegal’s democracy.
History will judge which version of the Council best serves the supremacy of the Constitution and the integrity of the state.
