Public health facilities across Morocco have faced alarming stockouts of HIV rapid tests for over a year, leaving patients without critical screening services. Meanwhile, local manufacturers stand ready with certified, domestically produced kits—available for immediate delivery upon order. This disconnect is not merely a logistical failure; it exposes a systemic flaw in the nation’s public procurement system, where the principle of national preference, enshrined in law, remains unenforced.
Legal safeguards ignored: the case of decree 2.22.431
Moroccan law explicitly mandates national preference in public contracts. Decree 2.22.431 requires technical specifications to be based solely on performance and function, prohibiting references to specific brands, origins, or patents. Yet, as Abdelhay Rhorba, public law professor at Université Hassan II de Casablanca, points out, these rules are frequently bypassed.
«Inserting overly precise technical conditions or demanding certifications held exclusively by a foreign competitor constitutes a violation of equal opportunity», he explains. «It may also amount to an abuse of power.» Moroccan administrative courts apply a straightforward test: if a tender’s specifications unjustly exclude domestic producers, it can be challenged.
Legal avenues exist. A formal complaint can first be lodged with the National Public Procurement Commission before contract finalization, followed by litigation within 60 days. In cases involving suspected corruption, Morocco’s penal code on influence peddling may also apply—but only if stakeholders have the means to pursue such action.
Cahiers des charges: perpetuating import dependency
On the ground, the reality is stark. Multiple industry sources report that special technical prescriptions (CPS) are routinely drafted around foreign products already in use, locking in long-standing import patterns and ignoring the nation’s growing manufacturing capacity.
A Moroccan medical device manufacturer, speaking on condition of anonymity, described the situation as «absurd». While his company’s HIV tests are already marketed across several African countries, domestic public procurement accounts for less than 2% of his segment’s market share. «The CPS should be based on Moroccan products, but today they are not», he said.
When local producers flag that a tender is clearly favoring foreign suppliers, the response from contracting authorities is often silence—or inaction. The procurement process remains unchanged, year after year.
Ministry of Finance pushes for domestic production—Ministry of Health resists
The contradiction extends beyond health facilities. While the Ministry of Finance recently raised import tariffs on certain medical devices to support local industry, the Ministry of Health continues purchasing high-cost imported alternatives, ignoring competitively priced domestic alternatives that meet national standards.
When contacted, the Directorate of Drug and Health Product Procurement at the Ministry of Health defended its approach, stating that tenders are «open to all operators meeting the required conditions, with special attention given to companies based in Morocco». The caveat? The requirement concerns company registration, not manufacturing origin. In practice, a foreign-owned importer registered locally is treated equally with a domestic manufacturer—even if its products are produced abroad.
HIV test shortages: a one-year crisis
HIV rapid test shortages have persisted in some public health structures for more than a year, according to multiple accounts. The Ministry acknowledges «occasional supply tensions», attributing them to «delays in public procurement procedures and international supply chain disruptions». It claims new tenders are underway to secure stock and is exploring «complementary alternatives».
Yet industry observers question this explanation. If local producers hold certified, available stock, why were they not engaged urgently to prevent months-long shortages?
The Ministry denies using direct award procedures, stating all 2025 acquisitions were conducted exclusively through competitive bidding in full compliance with regulations. This claim contradicts reports from multiple sources involved in the process, though no official documents have been made public to verify either account.
Under decree 2.22.431, direct awards are only permissible in cases of extreme urgency, technical exclusivity, or failed tenders—each requiring written justification and proof of no alternative. «Failure to comply renders the procedure illegal», warns Abdelhay Rhorba.
National health sovereignty: a distant goal
The procurement crisis reflects a deeper challenge: Morocco’s struggle to achieve health sovereignty. Dr. Jaafar Heikel, a leading infectious disease specialist, emphasizes that the absence of rapid tests does not halt HIV testing entirely—classical lab analyses remain available. Yet rapid tests are vital for reaching marginalized populations who avoid traditional healthcare settings.
«NGOs like OPALS and ALCS play a crucial role in HIV screening», he notes. «They rely on these tests to reach people who might never visit a lab.» Disruptions in their supply directly weaken community-based response efforts.
«When locally made tests are validated by state agencies, it benefits the country financially and strengthens health sovereignty», Dr. Heikel adds. «It’s a win-win.»
95-95-95 target at risk
Morocco has committed to the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets by 2030: 95% of people living with HIV knowing their status, 95% of those diagnosed on treatment, and 95% of those treated achieving viral suppression. These goals depend on widespread, rapid, and accessible testing.
«Without tests, fewer people are diagnosed—and the virus spreads», warns a local manufacturer. Dr. Heikel agrees: «Reaching 95-95-95 will happen faster with rapid tests and validated domestic production.»
The Ministry of Health asserts it remains «fully committed to ensuring continuous screening services». Yet industry players are waiting to see whether this commitment translates into revised tender specifications that truly open doors to local producers.
Some observers now openly question whether certain officials in validation commissions are protecting foreign suppliers—or their own interests—at the expense of ministerial directives.
Local investors who develop certified products, only to be systematically sidelined, may eventually abandon the market. The risk is clear: stifling domestic innovation just when Morocco needs it most—and continuing to import what the nation could produce itself.
