The Sahel no longer dominates global headlines, yet its crises continue to deepen. While international attention has shifted to conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and other global hotspots, the Sahel’s decade-long struggles with violent extremism and political instability have only worsened. The region now faces a dual crisis: escalating jihadist attacks and a growing authoritarian clampdown on freedoms, media and civil society.
Once considered Africa’s least affected by violent extremism, the Sahel has tragically transformed into the continent’s most dangerous zone. Since 2021, jihadist-related fatalities have tripled, reaching 11,200 in 2024. Disturbingly, state security forces and their Russian allies have been responsible for more civilian deaths than armed Islamist groups, as documented by multiple humanitarian sources. This grim reality leaves Sahelian populations trapped between state violence, jihadist brutality and unchecked authoritarianism.
The situation is particularly severe in the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Despite promises by military juntas to defeat jihadist groups, violence has surged. The region now ranks as the world’s most affected by Islamist violence, with civilian casualties mounting and state control slipping daily.
rising jihadist violence: a growing threat to civilians
Mali: between separatists, jihadists and state failures
Since the 2023 expulsion of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), Mali has seen a resurgence of armed conflict. The government, backed by Russian forces, has clashed with Tuareg separatists in the north while simultaneously battling jihadist groups. The reassertion of control over Kidal in October 2023 was hailed as a sovereignty victory, yet it did little to alter the broader balance of power.
The Group to Support Islam and Muslims (JNIM)—affiliated with Al-Qaeda—and the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawad People (CSP-DPA) briefly cooperated in July 2024, inflicting a major defeat on Malian and Wagner forces near Tinzaouaten. This ambush, which killed over 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries, marked Wagner’s largest loss in the Sahel to date.
By late 2024, jihadist groups had escalated attacks, including coordinated strikes on a gendarmerie school and Bamako’s military airport in September, killing over 70 security personnel and damaging the presidential aircraft. These high-profile attacks—targeting only military sites—suggest a strategic effort to win public sympathy, in contrast to the Islamic State in the Sahel, which relies on fear.
Civilian tolls have risen sharply. A July 2024 wedding attack in Mopti killed 40 people, while August drone strikes by the Malian army in retaliation for the Tinzaouaten ambush resulted in over 20 civilian deaths. Despite these crises, public confidence in national armed forces remains surprisingly high, according to 2024 surveys.
Burkina Faso: a state in retreat, civilians in the crossfire
Since the 2022 military coup, Burkina Faso has seen its security situation deteriorate rapidly. By 2024, state forces reportedly lost control of 60% of the national territory, with the JNIM active in 11 of 13 regions. Civilian deaths surged by 68% between 2022 and 2023, with 2024 on track to break that record.
The deadliest attack in Burkina Faso’s history occurred in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where JNIM militants targeted civilians forced to dig trenches for the army. Estimates of the death toll range from 130 to 600—an unprecedented tragedy for the region.
State forces have also been implicated in grave abuses. In February 2024, Human Rights Watch documented the summary execution of at least 223 civilians by the army in a single day. Reports of corpse mutilation by soldiers and massacres by civilian militias—such as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)—have further eroded public trust. In March 2025, VDP forces were accused of killing dozens of civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly, in Solenzo. The JNIM retaliated by attacking a military camp in Diapaga, killing over 30 soldiers and VDP members.
The junta’s strategy of arming civilians, launched in 2020 and intensified after the 2022 coup, has backfired. The VDP program—offering two weeks of training, weapons, communication tools, and a monthly stipend of 200,000 CFA francs—has deepened ethnic tensions and blurred the line between state forces, militias, jihadists and civilians. Over 2 million people have been internally displaced, the highest number in the region.
Niger: escalating violence despite relative stability
Niger, once considered more stable than its AES neighbors, has seen jihadist attacks intensify since the 2023 coup. Military operations have increased civilian casualties—state forces have killed three times more civilians than in the previous year, according to recent reports.
A 2024 study by the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S⁴) initiative found that Nigerien forces faced 51 attacks in nine months—nearly double the 2023 figure. Militant groups have grown more aggressive, targeting both civilians and security forces. In March 2024, 23 soldiers were killed in the Tillabéri region, while December attacks near the Burkina Faso border left 39 civilians dead. In March 2025, an attack on a mosque by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) killed 44 people.
While Niger remains relatively better off than Mali or Burkina Faso, the trajectory is concerning: since July 2023, the security situation has steadily worsened.
military rule and democratic backsliding in the Sahel
The military juntas that seized power in Mali (2020), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023) have systematically delayed democratic transitions. What began as temporary measures have become permanent fixtures, with constitutional reforms and extended mandates designed to consolidate power.
In Mali, the junta initially promised elections by February 2022 but repeatedly delayed the process. After negotiations with ECOWAS, a 24-month transition was announced, only to be extended again in 2024. By May 2024, a national dialogue recommended a two-to-five-year transition, allowing the junta leader to remain in power until 2029. In October 2024, the junta leader promoted himself to army general, symbolizing the military’s firm grip on governance.
Burkina Faso’s Captain Traoré, who led the 2022 coup, initially pledged elections by July 2024. By late 2023, however, he declared elections no longer a priority and announced a constitutional reform. In May 2024, the transition period was extended to 60 months, keeping Traoré in power until 2029.
Niger’s junta resisted setting an election date for 18 months. Only after a national dialogue in February 2025 was a renewable five-year transition proposed. The junta leader, already a general, promoted himself to army general in March 2025, just as he was sworn in for a five-year presidential term.
These prolonged transitions are not incidental. They enable the AES states to pursue deeper regional integration, including the creation of a joint force, and to forge new international partnerships—most notably with Russia, which has publicly pledged military support to the AES. For the European Union, this evolving reality demands a reassessment of its engagement strategy in the Sahel.
authoritarianism grows as state control weakens
Unable to assert authority over their territories, the AES regimes have turned to controlling information. Independent and foreign media outlets have been banned or suspended, journalists expelled or intimidated, and civil society organizations restricted or shut down. Political parties have been suspended, and opposition voices silenced through arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances.
In Mali, authorities have progressively restricted freedom of expression since 2020. Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 were banned in 2022, followed by the suspension of Joliba TV News in late 2024. Journalists critical of the regime have faced arbitrary detention, and civil society organizations have been closed under vague pretexts.
Burkina Faso’s trajectory mirrors Mali’s. RFI, France 24 and Jeune Afrique have been banned, and TV5Monde was suspended in 2024 for airing a critical interview. Since early 2025, a new wave of repression has targeted exiled opponents and media outlets, with several journalists abducted and forced to appear in military uniforms, claiming they now “cover the ground reality.”
In Niger, RFI and France 24 were suspended within days of the 2023 coup. Journalists covering security issues have been intimidated, arrested and imprisoned. Civil society organizations report arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances and violations of fair trial rights. Political parties have been suspended since July 2023, effectively silencing formal opposition.
These regimes are not only silencing dissent—they are rewriting reality. In October 2024, Burkina Faso’s government claimed it controlled 70% of the country, echoing the percentage attributed to jihadist groups by external observers. For citizens, distinguishing truth from propaganda has become increasingly difficult in a region where information is as contested as territory.
why the Sahel still matters to the world
The Sahel has largely disappeared from global media coverage, overshadowed by other crises and compounded by the repression of independent journalism in the AES states. Yet the silence surrounding the Sahel does not mean stability—it masks deepening insecurity.
The same crises that once compelled European and Western powers to engage in the region remain unaddressed and are worsening. Jihadist expansion continues unabated, food insecurity is reaching catastrophic levels, and internal displacement has reached record highs—over 3.1 million people displaced across Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Chad as of March 2025. Between June and August 2025, an estimated 52.7 million people in West Africa are expected to face acute hunger.
The Sahel may no longer be a strategic priority for the European Union, distracted by other global challenges. But disengagement is not a neutral act—it risks abandoning millions of people to violence, repression and humanitarian collapse. The consequences will not remain confined to the Sahel. Instability in the region fuels migration flows, exacerbates transnational crime and creates fertile ground for extremism that can reach Europe’s shores.
As the EU reconsiders its approach—marked by a reduced French presence and cautious re-engagement—it must ask critical questions: What are its priorities in the Sahel? What can realistically be achieved? And with whom should it partner?
One thing is clear: in a world increasingly divided, strengthening cross-continental solidarity and collaboration is essential to address shared global challenges. The Sahel’s crises demand not silence, but action—before they spiral further out of control.
