The security promises made by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are colliding with a reality that is becoming harder to conceal. A steady stream of jihadist attacks, combined with setbacks suffered by national forces and their Russian partners, is raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) security strategy. In Mali, the assault on Dioura and subsequent operations against military positions show that the threat persists despite the presence of Africa Corps.
What happened at Dioura
On 10 September, the military camp at Dioura in central Mali was hit by a major offensive claimed by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate. The death toll has risen sharply in the days since. Military, security and local sources indicate that at least 100 Malian soldiers and five members of the Russian Africa Corps were killed. Malian authorities have not released an official figure. JNIM claims a higher toll of 150 dead and 93 captured — numbers that cannot be independently verified.
The scale of the losses is not the only concern. Images released by the jihadist group suggest that a significant quantity of weapons, ammunition and vehicles was seized at Dioura. The Malian army site appears to have been turned into a supply source for JNIM fighters. The ability to temporarily overrun a military position and capture its equipment points to the difficulties Malian forces face on the ground.
Pressure edges closer to Bamako
Dioura is not an isolated episode. In the days that followed, JNIM stepped up operations against military installations in central Mali. Attacks targeted Konna and the Sévaré area, home to important Malian military infrastructure and Africa Corps personnel.
In Sévaré, kamikaze drones struck the zone where Russian helicopters and Turkish Bayraktar armed drones are stationed. The symbolism is hard to miss: the target was infrastructure meant to give Malian forces and their Russian partners a technological edge.
The threat is also reaching the outskirts of the capital. After several offensives against Malian positions in 2026, JNIM continues to demonstrate its ability to hit strategic routes and infrastructure near Bamako. The stakes are no longer limited to defending remote rural areas — protecting the country’s main political, military and economic centres is now part of the equation.
Africa Corps: a new name, contested results
Since the withdrawal of French forces and the UN mission, Bamako has deepened its military partnership with Moscow. Africa Corps, under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, has gradually taken over from Wagner in Mali. Its troop numbers are estimated by some sources at several thousand.
The cooperation was supposed to strengthen Malian military capabilities, restore territorial control and fight jihadist groups and armed movements more effectively. But recent events raise a central question: is the Russian presence actually improving security?
The setbacks of 2026 offer at least grounds for debate. In April, a coordinated offensive by JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) struck several Malian towns and military positions. In July, an ambush near Anéfis inflicted further losses on Malian forces and their Russian partners. Analysts have since highlighted the limits of Africa Corps against a jihadist strategy built on mobility, attrition and coordinated attacks.
Dioura reinforces a question that goes beyond Mali: can a foreign force, even one equipped with air power and drones, compensate for the structural weaknesses of a national army facing an insurgency rooted in the territory?
A crisis that crosses Mali’s borders
The problem concerns the entire AES. Burkina Faso and Niger are also grappling with persistent activity by armed jihadist groups. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, violence linked to militant Islamist groups has reached particularly high levels in the Sahel, with thousands of deaths recorded in recent years. JNIM alone accounts for a major share of deaths linked to militant violence in the region.
The Institute for Security Studies also estimates that evolving tactics and alliances among armed groups pose a growing challenge for Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It calls for more concrete regional cooperation between the three countries.
The AES, created precisely to strengthen defence and security cooperation among its members, now faces a contradiction. While its leaders present the alliance as a sovereign response to the region’s security difficulties, jihadist groups continue to show they can exploit gaps in military arrangements.
Measuring effectiveness beyond firepower
Questioning the effectiveness of Africa Corps does not mean Russian forces are incapable of conducting operations. They have aircraft, helicopters, drones and intelligence capabilities that can inflict losses on armed groups. But the growing number of attacks against Malian forces shows that these means alone are not enough to reverse the conflict’s momentum.
More worrying still, some operations attributed to Africa Corps have drawn serious accusations regarding civilians. Human Rights Watch says airstrikes in June in Kyrnia, in the Mopti region, killed eight civilians, including three children. The organisation also accuses Africa Corps fighters of killing nine civilians in Bombori in July. These accusations are disputed in their interpretation and must be placed in the context of operations against armed groups, but they fuel criticism of the methods used.
In an asymmetric war, firepower is only one part of the response. Protecting populations, local intelligence, lasting territorial control, securing roads and preventing armed groups from regenerating are just as decisive.
The AES security gamble put to the test
Dioura is therefore more than a tactical defeat. The attack comes after months of jihadist offensives and at a time when Bamako is heavily invested in its partnership with Moscow.
For AES governments, the challenge is now to show that their security model can deliver lasting results. Yet the succession of attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger shows that the jihadist threat remains deeply entrenched.
Africa Corps has changed the AES military setup, but it has not removed the threat. In Mali, the attacks on Dioura, Sévaré and areas near Bamako are a blunt reminder of that reality.
The true measure of the AES security strategy will not be the number of weapons delivered, strikes carried out or fighters announced as neutralised. It will be measured by the ability of states to protect their soldiers and populations over the long term, secure their territories and prevent armed groups from seizing the initiative. On that front, recent events show the challenge remains entirely unresolved.
