Following the coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 that targeted Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged in Malian security discussions: should dialogue be initiated with jihadist groups? Given the extensive nature of the offensive, jointly executed by Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), several analysts and observers now contend that a purely military approach has reached its limits.
This offensive spread across Mali with unprecedented speed, from its northern reaches to its southern territories. Armed factions launched multiple synchronized attacks against military forces and symbols of authority in at least six cities, extending to the outskirts of Bamako. For the first time, Jnim and the FLA visibly operated in concert. Established in November 2024 after the dissolution of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast region in northern Mali.
These attacks have starkly exposed the Malian regime’s vulnerability. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian allies from Africa Corps appear capable of curbing the armed groups’ progression. In regional media and diplomatic circles, the prospect of negotiations with Jnim is now openly discussed, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual isolation and deepening regional entanglement. Despite this, the junta continues to publicly dismiss any notion of discussion. Bamako maintains its stance of excluding all dialogue with armed terrorist groups, upholding a strictly military line despite the rapid deterioration of the security situation.
Since late April, pressure on the regime has only intensified. Violence is escalating in the central part of the country. Recently, several villages in the Bankass region, including Kouroude and Dougara, were attacked. Local and security sources indicate that the combined death toll from attacks on Wednesday and Friday ranges between 70 and 80.
unprecedented alliance: a stark warning
Jnim remains the primary driver of jihadist activity across the Sahel, notably in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas consolidated within the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the predicament is tightening. Having ascended to power with promises of restoring security, they struggle to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, for nearly a year, attacks have been relentlessly closing in on the capital.
“From July 2025, jihadists conducted attacks in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively suffocating the capital,” observes Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Center at Ifri. Héni Nsaibia of Acled analyzes, “This time, what is striking is not just the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate choice of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very heart of the regime.”
The death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati profoundly shook the government. Simultaneously, the loss of Kidal – recaptured in late 2023 and presented as a significant victory – constitutes a major strategic setback.
the strategy of attrition
Even before this offensive, several experts had noted an evolution in Jnim’s strategy. Alain Antil previously explained, “There is a desire to establish a more powerful dynamic, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities to negotiate.”
The jihadist group is now attempting to replicate at a national scale tactics it previously employed locally: economic blockades, gradual encirclement of urban centers, and pressure on logistical supply routes. “Jnim is striving to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako,” the researcher insists.
For Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactic is conceived for the long term: “They have chosen to weaken the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of attrition and exploiting the military system’s existing fractures.” He adds, “Jnim no longer makes the application of Sharia a prerequisite for peace and now states its openness to negotiation.”
In this complex landscape, the rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group seeks to expand its territorial control and influence.
a once-taboo option gains traction
Officially, Sahelian regimes refuse any idea of dialogue. Alain Antil observes, “For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not considered. The discourse remains martial, with military response as the sole option.”
Yet, on the ground, the reality is more intricate. The abuses committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, approximately 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian allies in Mali, nearly five times more than those attributed to Jnim, according to GI-TOC data. This violence fuels resentment and facilitates jihadist recruitment.
States must commit to a brave compromise.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher
Faced with this impasse, an increasing number of experts advocate for a paradigm shift. Alain Antil of Ifri believes, “A military-only option is a dead end when confronting the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be combined with political negotiations.” He suggests that certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources – could form a basis for discussion, without overlooking their inherent violence.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa goes further: “States must commit to a brave compromise. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political arena to reveal their limitations.” However, he sets clear red lines: “The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable.”
As jihadist offensives advance, the concept of negotiation is transforming from a heresy into a credible political hypothesis. For many experts in Mali, the question is no longer whether to engage in dialogue, but rather how much longer Bamako can realistically refuse to do so.
