A narrative of reclaimed control
Since Captain Ibrahim Traoré assumed power, an official narrative has gradually taken shape: that of a Burkina Faso which has regained command of its own destiny, curtailed its external dependence and resolved to finance its campaign against armed groups from its own resources.
The message carries considerable political weight. Rearmament is presented as the tangible expression of sovereignty. Acquisitions of military hardware are showcased, the Patriotic Support Fund is portrayed as proof of a collective national effort, and appeals for citizen contributions serve to demonstrate that the country would rely first and foremost on its own means.
Yet a far less ideological question lingers: what does this sovereignty actually cost, and who bears the bill?
A defence budget that has changed scale
Budgetary figures already quantify the shift.
Spending on defence and security, which stood at roughly 95 billion CFA francs in 2016, has since climbed to several hundred billion, surpassing 800 billion in 2024 according to the budgetary perimeters applied.
The increase is substantial. It reflects an unambiguous political priority: in a country grappling with a major security crisis, the state now devotes a far greater share of its resources to the army, the security forces, equipment and the war effort.
Such a spectacular rise, however, cannot be examined through a strictly military lens. Every additional billion allocated to security is also a billion that must be found elsewhere.
It is precisely at this point that the discourse on sovereignty deserves to be tested against financial mechanisms.
The patriotic fund does not cover everything
The Patriotic Support Fund stands as one of the central symbols of this strategy. Contributions have reached substantial sums since its inception: close to 99 billion CFA francs in its first year, approximately 175 billion in 2024 and more than 200 billion according to the figures released for 2025.
It would therefore be unfair to dismiss the scale of the national mobilisation.
But another illusion must be avoided: the Fund alone does not represent the entirety of the financing behind the war effort.
The state budget remains the principal vehicle for funding public policy. Military expenditure is therefore also sustained by tax revenue, by the ordinary resources of the state and, whenever revenue falls short, by recourse to borrowing.
In other words, contributing voluntarily to the war effort does not mean the war is financed without debt.
Public debt wears a different face
This is where the debate becomes more instructive.
Burkina Faso’s public debt has risen sharply since 2021 and now exceeds 8,000 billion CFA francs, based on the data and projections available for recent years.
A significant portion of that debt is now raised on the regional UEMOA market, notably through the issuance of public securities.
This allows Burkina Faso to diversify its funding sources and to reduce certain dependencies on external creditors.
Yet debt contracted on the regional market remains debt. Whether it is held by a bank, an institutional investor or another financial actor in the region does not alter its economic nature: the state borrows today and will have to repay tomorrow, with interest.
Here the communication around sovereignty reaches its limits.
One may legitimately defend the choice to prioritise domestic financing. One may equally consider that borrowing from the regional market is preferable to certain forms of external dependence.
Presenting that mechanism as the disappearance of financial dependence, however, would be misleading.
The decisive question: where does public money go?
The issue is not whether Burkina Faso has the right to rearm. It plainly does.
The issue is to establish what this rearmament costs the public finances as a whole.
When a growing share of resources is channelled towards security, the government must arbitrate between competing priorities: defence, education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, social protection and debt repayment.
Such trade-offs are rarely visible in political speeches. Yet they constitute the true test of economic sovereignty.
A state can purchase more weapons while remaining financially vulnerable. It can scale back certain foreign military partnerships while increasing its reliance on borrowing. It can mobilise patriotic contributions while devoting a growing portion of its future revenue to servicing debt.
A diplomatic rupture, then, does not automatically translate into a financial one.
The mechanical weight of debt service
A less conspicuous but far more durable risk also exists: that of debt servicing.
Every loan taken out today creates an obligation for the years ahead. When interest rates are high and investment needs remain considerable, the government must dedicate more resources to meeting its maturities.
The mechanism is simple: the more the state borrows, the more it must set aside tomorrow to pay its creditors.
The problem is not necessarily indebtedness as such — every modern state borrows. The question is whether the expenditure financed by that debt generates sufficient economic and social returns for the country to carry the future burden.
For military spending, the equation is even more delicate: a piece of military equipment may be indispensable to national security, but it does not necessarily generate the revenue needed to repay the loan that financed it.
Military autonomy, economic exposure
This is the contradiction that the Burkinabè model lays bare.
The authorities claim strategic autonomy: new partners, a diversification of alliances, national mobilisation and a scaling back of certain traditional partnerships.
At the same time, the economy continues to operate with the classic instruments of public financing: taxation, domestic debt, the regional market, multilateral creditors and economic cooperation.
This is not an exceptional contradiction. It is the ordinary functioning of a state facing limited resources and enormous security demands.
Difficulties arise when political communication transforms that financial reality into a narrative of absolute self-sufficiency.
Beware of spectacular figures
Certain claims circulating on social networks also require clarification.
References to military indebtedness amounting to “hundreds of billions of dollars” are incompatible with the scale of Burkina Faso’s economy.
The country’s GDP lies in the range of a few tens of billions of dollars, not hundreds of billions. A military debt of several hundred billion dollars would vastly exceed the country’s economic capacity.
Reality is already significant enough not to require exaggeration. What is at stake are hundreds of billions of CFA francs, not hundreds of billions of dollars.
That distinction is essential to any serious analysis.
The paradox of a sovereignty purchased on credit
Burkina Faso can therefore legitimately assert political and military sovereignty while remaining an indebted state.
But that reality forces a more demanding question: how far can the financing of war go without weakening the other functions of the state?
Sovereignty is not measured solely by the number of armoured vehicles, drones or weapons acquired. It is also measured by the capacity to pay civil servants, to invest in education and health, to finance infrastructure, to support the productive economy and, above all, to repay the loans contracted in the name of the community.
The real challenge, then, is not to deny the efforts made by the Burkinabè authorities. It is to look behind the narrative.
Who pays? How much? With what resources? And for how long?
If a substantial part of the rearmament rests on public revenue, national contributions and borrowing, then the sovereignty proclaimed is not a sovereignty without cost. It is a sovereignty financed by taxpayers, savers, financial markets and future generations.
That is precisely why the phrase “sovereignty on credit” deserves to be posed as a question rather than repeated as a slogan.
Political independence can be proclaimed in a handful of speeches. Financial independence, by contrast, is verified in the accounts.
