Key developments
In 2025, President Mahamat Idriss Déby solidified his grip on power following his victory in the 2024 presidential election, an outcome heavily criticized by the opposition due to alleged irregularities. Subsequent constitutional amendments approved in 2025 removed presidential term limits and extended each mandate from five to seven years. This effectively allows Mahamat Idriss Déby to remain in power indefinitely, provided elections are held every seven years.
The political opposition operated within a highly constrained environment. Succès Masra, a prominent opposition leader who challenged the 2024 election results, was arrested and subsequently sentenced to twenty years in prison. Activists, members of Masra’s party, and journalists faced significant intimidation and arrests throughout the year.
A controversial amnesty law, shielding perpetrators of abuses linked to the October 2022 demonstrations from legal prosecution, has stifled discussions on justice for the past three years.
Intercommunal violence persisted in 2025 across southern and eastern Chad, primarily between herders and settled farming communities. These clashes resulted in dozens of fatalities across multiple incidents. Displacements caused by these conflicts, alongside the ongoing crisis in neighboring Sudan, severely strained humanitarian aid capacities. Refugee flows from Sudan continued into Chad. Furthermore, Chad was among the regions most affected by severe floods in late 2024 and early 2025, exacerbating an already critical food insecurity situation.
Progress on reparations for victims of abuses committed during former President Hissène Habré’s rule remained minimal in 2025, despite partial payments made in 2024. The 2024 disbursements fell significantly short of the judicially ordered amounts.
Escalating violence in the south and east
Despite official claims that measures were being implemented to address the root causes of violent clashes between nomadic Fulani herders and local farmers – such as unclear land titles and lack of designated livestock migration routes – these efforts proved ineffective. The south and east of Chad witnessed a marked increase in such conflicts in 2025.
In May, the village of Mandakao, located in Logone-Occidental province, experienced deadly confrontations stemming from disputes over pasture and farmland boundaries. Government reports indicated at least 41 fatalities and six injuries in this incident. Media outlets suggested the conflict originated from contested land demarcation, with farmers asserting encroachment by herders and herders arguing that absent clear boundaries compelled them onto agricultural lands.
In June, violence erupted in Orégomel, Mayo-Kebbi Ouest province in the south, when disagreements between herders and farmers escalated into machete attacks. At least 17 people, including women and children, were killed, with many others wounded. Mid-June also saw inter-tribal clashes in Molou, Ouaddaï province in the east, leaving approximately twenty dead and at least sixteen injured.
The violence surrounding Mandakao, Orégomel, and Molou reflects a broader trend of escalating farmer-herder conflicts, intensified by population pressure, diminishing arable land, and climate change constraints, a critical element in any comprehensive Sahel analysis English perspective.
Shrinking political space
On May 16, Succès Masra, the former Prime Minister and leader of the opposition party Les Transformateurs, was arrested in N’Djamena, the capital, on alleged links to the deadly intercommunal violence in Mandakao.
Masra faced charges including incitement to hatred, xenophobia, and – via social media – complicity in murder. He was tried alongside dozens of other individuals, pleading not guilty. On August 9, he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and a fine of one billion CFA francs (approximately US$1.8 million). Masra’s co-defendants also received twenty-year prison sentences for similar accusations.
The politically motivated arrest and swift trial of Succès Masra effectively neutralized political opposition and silenced dissent. Furthermore, his arrest and conviction violated the Kinshasa Agreement of October 2023, which had suspended an arrest warrant against him and guaranteed him, his supporters, and his party the right to return from exile and freely engage in political activities. This situation is a key concern for Sahel politics observers and West Africa insider news analysts.
Constitutional amendments
In September 2025, Chad’s National Assembly approved constitutional amendments that extended the presidential term from five to seven years and removed any limits on the number of terms. This eliminated all previous constraints that provided a degree of oversight on the presidential mandate.
The vote, largely boycotted by the opposition, passed in the lower chamber with 171 votes in favor, one abstention, and no votes against.
These reforms were approved by both parliamentary chambers and promulgated by the president in October.
These constitutional changes significantly concentrate power in the hands of Mahamat Idriss Déby, altering constitutional balances and legislative checks, and leaving minimal room for debate or opposition, a critical development for Chad human rights 2026 and broader Sahel politics discussions.
Political violence, dissent, and repression
Despite calls for investigations to identify those responsible for the celebratory gunfire that followed Mahamat Idriss Déby’s 2024 election victory, no genuine inquiries or legal prosecutions were initiated in 2025. Little in the way of real compensation or recourse was offered to victims. At least 11 individuals were killed and many others, including children, were injured by stray bullets and rockets fired into homes by security forces in 2024.
The death of opposition leader Yaya Dillo during a security forces’ assault on his party headquarters, shortly before the presidential election, remained uninvestigated in 2025. In December 2024, Chadian authorities released 24 relatives of Yaya Dillo who had been arrested after his killing and detained at Koro Toro high-security prison. Ten other individuals also held at Koro Toro had been acquitted in July 2024.
In June, Robert Gam, leader of Yaya Dillo’s Socialist Party Without Borders, was released after eight months of detention without ever being charged with any offense.
In September, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization issued a decree revoking the nationality of Makaila Nguebla, a blogger who served as a human rights advisor during the transition, and activist-journalist Charfadine Galmaye Saleh. Both men are currently living in exile abroad.
In March, journalists Olivier Monodji and Mahamat Saleh Alhissein were apprehended and charged with espionage, conspiracy, and undermining state security for their alleged connections to or reporting on the Wagner Group, the Russian mercenary organization active in Central Africa and the Sahel. Their prolonged detention without trial violated international standards prohibiting arbitrary detention and mandating due process. They were eventually released in July. This incident highlights concerns for press freedom across the Sahel Insider landscape.
Sexual orientation and gender identity
Article 354 of the 2017 Penal Code prohibits “sexual relations with persons of the same sex.” Under this code, individuals convicted of homosexual acts face up to two years imprisonment and fines ranging from 50,000 to 500,000 CFA francs (approximately US$75 to US$750).
