The jihadist group JNIM announced on Friday, September 25, 2026, that it had seized full control of several military positions held by Burkinabè militias in Silmossin, near the town of Dédougou. The claim adds to a growing list of operations the group says it has carried out against Burkinabè forces and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP).
On the same day, JNIM also claimed to have overrun two positions used by the Burkinabè army and VDP in Aoréma and Klio, in the north of the country.
Beyond the accuracy of each individual claim, the steady stream of announcements raises a central question: how effective is the security strategy put in place since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power?
A doctrine built on reconquest and popular mobilization
For several years, the Burkinabè authorities have presented the reconquest of territory, the strengthening of national forces and the mobilization of the VDP as the pillars of a new security doctrine. But a military strategy cannot be judged solely by the number of soldiers deployed, operations announced or territories declared recaptured. It is measured above all by the state’s ability to hold its positions over time, protect populations, secure road corridors and prevent armed groups from returning to areas that have been retaken.
It is precisely on this question of durability that difficulties persist.
The heavy reliance on the VDP has widened the defense apparatus, but it also exposes non-professional fighters to particularly vulnerable positions. Analyses of JNIM operations highlight the importance of factors such as intelligence, mobility, logistics, road surveillance, coordination between units and, above all, the capacity to hold advanced positions over the long term.
Holding ground is not the same as restoring state authority
The problem runs deeper than a single battle won or lost. Retaking a position does not necessarily mean durably restoring state authority. A genuinely secure area must allow administrations to function, schools to reopen, markets to resume activity, farmers to return to their fields and displaced populations to come back.
It is on this terrain that the security record of the Traoré regime deserves closer scrutiny.
Since taking power, Captain Ibrahim Traoré has made sovereignty, popular mobilization and military reconquest central elements of his political discourse. Official communications regularly stress the successes of national forces. But when armed groups continue to claim attacks on military positions or VDP units, those announcements must be weighed against what is observable on the ground.
On September 25, Burkina Faso’s foreign minister himself acknowledged the need to learn lessons from what “has not worked so far” and stressed the importance of preventing the recruitment of young people by terrorist groups.
That statement matters: it shows that even within official circles, a purely military response is seen as insufficient.
An adaptable insurgency
Burkina Faso is facing a highly adaptable insurgency. JNIM has developed capabilities in mobility, intelligence, financing and the use of new technologies, while its operations continue to put pressure on security forces and civilians. ACLED has highlighted the evolution of jihadist tactics, the growing use of drones and the difficulties Sahelian states face in durably preventing armed groups from re-infiltrating certain areas.
The real challenge for Ibrahim Traoré is therefore no longer just to produce a narrative of victory. It is to demonstrate, with figures and results, that the strategy pursued since 2022 is actually reducing violence over the long term and restoring state authority.
Political communication can present advances. The ground imposes a different requirement: lasting security for populations.
Why some areas remain so hard to secure
If JNIM’s claims in Silmossin were to be confirmed, they would represent yet another signal of the vulnerability of advanced positions. But even before any confirmation, the multiplication of claims against Burkinabè positions raises a legitimate question: why do some areas remain so difficult to secure despite increases in personnel, equipment and resources devoted to counterterrorism?
This is where the real assessment of Ibrahim Traoré’s security record lies.
The debate should not be limited to slogans, images of military operations or victory declarations. It must focus on verifiable indicators: durably secured territories, attacks on civilians, military losses, freedom of movement, the return of displaced people, the functioning of public services and the ability of national forces to hold recaptured positions.
Without transparent data to measure these elements, the gap between the official narrative and information from the field will continue to fuel questions.
And in a war against armed groups, it is not slogans that settle the debate: it is durable results on the ground.
