Exactly five years have passed since General Assimi Goïta seized control of Mali through a military coup. In the intervening period, the country has faced mounting criticism regarding a perceived decline in the well-being of the Malian populace. Concerns include diminished security, reduced freedom of expression, and a shrinking space for press freedom.

To gain deeper insight into this complex situation, I spoke with Ulf Laessing, who directs the Sahel program at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

Insights from Ulf Laessing

Ulf Laessing observed a noticeable increase in repression. He noted that open discourse has become more challenging, even if candid conversations are still possible among trusted individuals. However, a pervasive sense of caution now characterizes public expression. This represents a clear point of contention against the government. Furthermore, critical voices have faced imprisonment, while others have been compelled to seek exile.

What tangible improvements have the Malian people experienced since the military assumed power?

Ulf Laessing responded that, initially, certain regions did see a slight improvement in security. For instance, the road leading to Ségou remained open for an extended period, allowing some farmers to return to their fields. However, this positive trend has not endured. The crisis has intensified, and given the immense demographic growth, the impacts of climate change, and persistent insecurity, I hold a very pessimistic view on any government’s ability to significantly alter the current trajectory.

In 2020, the military took power with the stated aim of eradicating jihadist groups. This objective appears far from being met.

Ulf Laessing confirmed that both JNIM and the Islamic State effectively control certain areas of the country. He believes it’s unlikely that any government, whether through another coup or a future elected body, will succeed in reclaiming these territories. I remain quite pessimistic about the prospects for pacifying the nation.

In late April, jihadists and Tuareg rebels even launched several coordinated attacks.

Ulf Laessing described these events as a profound shock. It marked the largest assault since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly seized control of the north before French forces intervened a year later. This was a direct challenge to the state’s authority. While the government has managed to remain in power, losing some northern territories, the rebels do not seem to be making further advances for now. Nevertheless, it represents a significant blow to the government’s prestige. The attack was dramatic and entirely unexpected, especially by the Russian mercenaries who were deployed with the stated purpose of enhancing security.

These same Russian mercenaries reportedly withdrew without significant engagement. Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), issued statements but provided no military support. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you explain this?

Ulf Laessing explained that the Russian presence has always been more about optics than substance. With approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, they represent only a third of the French forces, who themselves struggled to pacify the entire country. Their brutal tactics have arguably exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern locations without a fight was a humiliation. Similarly, little tangible support came from Niger and Burkina Faso. They claimed to have provided air support, but in reality, Mali was largely on its own that day. This wasn’t surprising, as both Niger and Burkina Faso are grappling with their own severe jihadist threats. I doubt they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the desire.

Is the solidarity frequently proclaimed by the three AES states weaker than generally perceived?

Ulf Laessing clarified that while politically, these nations are closely aligned and share many aspirations, they lack the political will and, critically, the capabilities to realize these ambitions. The three military leaders are united by a common ideology, but it’s important to remember these are three of the world’s poorest countries. One must be realistic about the potential of such cooperation. This isn’t a European Union building infrastructure together or a NATO alliance providing mutual defense. These are three extremely impoverished nations fighting for their very survival.

What potential solutions could emerge from this situation?

Ulf Laessing highlighted a positive aspect: the Malian people generally reject Sharia law and Islamist rule. This sentiment, he believes, could have been a catalyst for protests in Mali, despite the inherent dangers and repression. However, the population’s clear opposition to such alternatives has prevented widespread unrest. He expressed hope that this underlying sentiment could serve as a foundation for future action, suggesting that at some point, genuine negotiations might be possible with the more moderate elements among the jihadist groups, leading to a constructive dialogue.

But what could be the basis for negotiation? Jihadists aim to control the country and impose Sharia law. How can one negotiate with such entities?

Ulf Laessing believes that JNIM is unlikely to be capable of controlling a major city like Bamako or the entire country. Their objective, he suggests, is to be left undisturbed, to control specific regions, and to reach arrangements with other factions. In Bamako, they seek a government that might implement a degree of Sharia law and engage in negotiations with them. Unlike some Middle Eastern counterparts, these jihadists are not foreign combatants motivated by a desire for violence. They are local actors, often exploiting issues like access to water and land. Therefore, at some point, engaging in discussions will become necessary. While military action is vital, dialogue with moderate individuals is equally crucial. There are already localized pressures for such engagement within Mali.

Mauritania faced a similar challenge, responding with both military force and strategic compromises. For example, alcohol is no longer permitted, and the country is officially an Islamic Republic. It’s not about fully implementing a Taliban-style agenda, but rather finding common ground to satisfy the country’s needs. Once instability is mitigated, the state will naturally have more room to operate.

And what are the aspirations of the Malian populace?

Ulf Laessing reiterated that people in Bamako do not desire to live under Sharia law. This was evident during the late April attacks: there were no widespread demonstrations or strong demands for the government’s resignation. The population understands that if the current government falls, the next one is likely to be more Islamist, which is not what they want. Despite all criticisms leveled against the military government, it must be acknowledged that many people still support it. They reject the alternatives: they do not want jihadists, nor do they want the return of the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as being too closely aligned with France and Europe. Therefore, I believe that if no further major attacks occur, the government will likely remain in power, given the existing public support.

So, you don’t believe that the impression given by social media is misleading, and that in reality, a significant portion of the population, especially the youth, supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

Ulf Laessing pointed out that the average age in Mali is 15, with many young people no longer attending school. They have no strong ties to Europe or France and primarily get their information from social media, which is often saturated with propaganda, including disinformation disseminated by Russians to bolster government support. I maintain that there is still backing for the government. The late April attacks would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. This was also true in the autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no one protested, clearly indicating that people do not wish to be governed by JNIM.

Perhaps their primary concern is simply survival, a situation now exacerbated by the blockade imposed on Bamako?

Ulf Laessing affirmed that life has indeed become considerably more difficult, even prior to these recent attacks. People have grown resigned, having lost all illusions about politicians. It’s also important to acknowledge that political parties and established politicians have largely lost credibility. Many of them have already held power, and conditions did not improve. Consequently, many Malians feel compelled to give the current leadership a chance.